Bisrat Lemessa Kabeta
Once again, the Horn of Africa is emerging as a stage for longstanding geopolitical disputes. On the one hand, Addis Ababa is strengthening its economic and security capabilities by leveraging its natural resources and striving for maritime access, which it considers an existential necessity. Cairo and Mogadishu, on the other hand, are escalating a military buildup in Somalia to counter Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive initiatives, seen as threats to their respective national interests. In response to concerns over Somalia’s militarization, deemed provocative and a potential threat to national and regional security, Addis Ababa is implementing preventive measures, including putting its national defence forces on heightened alert.
Meanwhile, preparations are underway to replace the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). However, the planning process has encountered difficult decisions, as it has become a central issue in the brewing regional tensions. If not managed cautiously, AU’s next mission in Somalia might cultivate conditions conducive to a catastrophic proxy conflict in the region, which it aims to help stabilize. While preventing an imminent confrontation should be a top priority, understanding that these tensions are only the most recent episode in protracted geopolitical contests for resources, territory, and influence is equally crucial for effectively addressing the underlying factors.
Egypt’s Legacy of Power: Commanding the Nile and the Red Sea
Egypt’s twofold strategy in East Africa—protecting its claim to veto rights over Nile waters and dominance along the Red Sea route—has long strained its relations with Ethiopia. Cairo’s interest in the Nile and the Red Sea is justified, given that they provide 90% of the country’s freshwater and generate significant marine revenue, respectively, serving as critical economic drivers. However, its desire to control these resources displays a sense of entitlement and a lack of consideration for the rights and interests of other regional nations.
In keeping with this orientation, successive Egyptian regimes have prioritized undermining Ethiopia’s capabilities to prevent it from developing its water resources and establishing itself as a naval actor. For instance, in the nineteenth century, Egyptian forces, seeking to control the Nile basin, tried to invade Ethiopia but were defeated in the Battles of Gundet (1875) and Gura (1876). When direct control became unfeasible, colonial-era treaties (Anglo-Egyptian in 1929 and Sudanese-Egyptian in 1959) were devised to secure Egypt’s exclusive claims to the Nile, disregarding Ethiopia’s rights to its waters, which account for 85% of the total flow. Moreover, Egyptian governments maintained a long history of seeking to influence Ethiopian internal affairs by backing various insurgencies, including Eritrean secessionists (1950-1990s), and harbouring propaganda entities and other opposition movements up until now.
Relations between the two countries deteriorated even further when work on Africa’s biggest hydroelectric project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), began in April 2011 on the Abay River, Ethiopia’s largest tributary of the Nile. Ethiopia’s decision to begin construction in April 2011 was strategically timed. Just two months after the Arab Spring toppled Egypt’s longtime leader, Hosni Mubarak, in February of that year, Cairo was still reeling from the upheaval and unable to exert its traditional diplomatic influence to counter Ethiopia’s move. Sudan was also facing its own challenges with the upcoming independence of South Sudan, set for July 2011, and the impending resultant loss of 75% of its oil reserves. Seeking a more stable water flow and affordable electricity to boost its agricultural investments, which were intended to compensate for the loss in oil revenues, Khartoum was ready for a flexible stance towards initiatives like the GERD. This marked a radical shift in Sudan’s stance, moving away from supporting Cairo’s historical water claims unconditionally.
Viewing the GERD as a threat to its water security, Cairo eventually embarked on an extensive diplomatic campaign, coupled with a warning that it was considering “all options,” to pressure Addis Ababa to halt the project, yet without success. As construction progressed, Egyptian officials accepted the project’s inevitability and shifted their efforts towards reaching a binding agreement on the dam’s filling, operation, and dispute resolution protocols. However, Addis Ababa, interested only in formulating amendable guidelines, rejected any potentially restrictive agreements on the grounds that such deals would undermine Ethiopia’s sovereignty.
Due to these incompatible approaches to resolving the dispute, except for the Agreement on Declaration of Principles, all other talks, including those sponsored by the AU and the US, have failed to yield meaningful results. Similarly, Egypt’s efforts to involve the UN Security Council were unsuccessful, as the Council refused to intervene in transboundary river disputes and deferred the issue to the AU. Cairo, becoming more uneasy as work approached completion, turned to an openly confrontational stance by executing a military drill with the Sudanese army in 2021 and 2022, calling their joint venture “Guardians of the Nile.” However, the Cairo-Khartoum military alliance formed to counter Ethiopia ended with Sudan’s descent into civil war in April 2023.
For Ethiopia, the GERD, with a generating capacity of 5,150 MW, is a hydroelectric project critically needed to meet the enormous energy demands of its rapidly growing population, the second largest in Africa. When construction began in 2011, 77% of Ethiopia’s 93 million people did not have access to electricity. By mid-2024, the total population had already passed 130 million and was on course to reach 200 million before 2050, driving electricity demand even further. The energy requirements of the rapidly expanding economy, presently experiencing a 7% GDP growth rate with a remarkable 28% rise in the industrial sector, underscore the vitality of the GERD for Ethiopia’s social and economic well-being.
Besides its economic potential, Ethiopians see the GERD as a symbol of breaking free from a historical geopolitical architecture that has prevented them from using their natural resources, trapping them in a cycle of instability and poverty. It is no secret that the Ethiopian public is resentful of Egypt’s persistent efforts to obstruct development initiatives on Ethiopia’s Nile’s tributaries, which Cairo sustained via its well-established diplomatic networks and capitalising on colonial-era treaties. Determined to disrupt this status quo, which they perceive as motivated by historical colonial interests imposed on the nation, Ethiopians at home and in the diaspora campaigned to raise funds for the construction, estimated at 4.2 billion USD at launch.
Countering Cairo’s water security concerns, Ethiopian authorities assert that the GERD does not cause any significant harm to the Nile’s riparian region. They argue that the initiative, in fact, increases opportunities for regional integration, as expansion in Ethiopia’s power-generating capacity benefits neighbouring countries by enabling access to a larger and more steady power supply. Additionally, the reservoir provides a consistent water flow to downstream countries, mitigating the adverse effects of seasonal floods and water scarcity on human life, infrastructure, and livelihoods.
Emphasising that the GERD is a development project constructed on its river inside its borders, Addis Ababa strongly rejected Cairo’s notion that it should be viewed as an international security issue. Instead, it sought to address its disputes with Cairo (and Khartoum) through talks facilitated under the umbrella of the African Union and, working towards this objective, vigorously promoted the ratification of the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). For Ethiopia and the upper riparian countries, the transition of the CFA to implementation this month (October 2024) is a significant milestone in decolonising Nile treaties, ensuring equitable utilization of their water resources, and effectively addressing existing and future disagreements over the Nile waters. Despite being a founding member of the Nile Basin Initiative, Cairo has refused to ratify the CFA, arguing that the agreement does not constitute specific water-allocation provisions.
The international community’s response to the Cairo-Addis Ababa dispute has evolved in line with shifting regional dynamics and global priorities. Initial reactions, triggered mainly by Cairo’s diplomatic manoeuvres and pressure tactics to stop the project, focused on bilateral talks. Acknowledging the inevitability of the GERD, Cairo eventually softened its stance, paving the way for negotiations that culminated in the 2015 tripartite Agreement on Declaration of Principles (ADP), which was widely welcomed as a positive step. However, progress toward practical agreements was slow because of disagreements over the nature and specifics of such agreements and due to political changes taking place in Ethiopia (2018) and Sudan (2019).
As tensions mounted and the tripartite platform failed to produce concrete agreements, the United States intervened, with the World Bank observing the talks. The U.S. Treasury prepared a filling and operations deal facilitated by President Trump, which Egypt quickly endorsed. However, the nature of the President’s involvement in the dispute sparked diplomatic backlash, as Ethiopia withdrew from the talks, citing bias towards Cairo and concerns about its sovereignty. In retaliation, the State Department cut “nearly $130 million in U.S. foreign assistance to Ethiopia,” a move that was widely criticized across Africa. Relations between the two countries reached a new low when President Trump suggested that Cairo might “blow up” the dam, prompting Addis Ababa to summon the US Ambassador and condemn the remark as an “incitement of war between Ethiopia and Egypt from a sitting US president.” Later, the succeeding administration under President Biden adopted a more neutral stance towards the GERD and focused on encouraging talks.
Another notable actor in the GERD dispute mediation is the African Union. Initially, the AU took a passive position on the issue, likely due to the delicate diplomatic situation created by the strong influences of both Addis Ababa and Cairo within the organization. However, after the Security Council decided to pass the GERD issue back to the AU and upon Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s request following the collapse of the US-brokered deal, the AU became more involved in facilitating talks among the three parties, yet with no tangible progress like all the others. In the meantime, unhinged by Cairo’s pressure for a negotiated filling arrangement, Addis Ababa has completed over 95% of the construction and five rounds of reservoir filling and is currently producing 1,550 MW of electricity, with just four of the 13 turbines planned to be installed. Cairo seems reluctant to accept the new regional dynamics and is still invested in trying to block Ethiopia’s strategic initiatives by sponsoring an adversarial coalition with Mogadishu and other regional actors.
Historical Roots: The Greater Somalia Project and Lingering Tensions
Current tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa partly stem from Mogadishu’s legacy of expansive aspirations—its postcolonial objective of the sociopolitical unification of Somalis across the Horn of Africa. Centred on Mogadishu’s ambitions to annexe territories in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, the irredentist Greater Somalia project set off regional tensions. In pursuing this objective, Mogadishu sought to weaken the Ethiopian state by backing various separatist insurgencies during the 1970s and 1980s. Seeing a time of political upheaval in Ethiopia as an opportunity, the Siad Barre administration in Mogadishu waged war on the country and invaded its southeast region in 1977.
The war, which ended with the defeat of the Somalian army in 1978, severely weakened the regime, which became embroiled in a civil war that ultimately led to the collapse of the Somalian state in 1992. By then, Somaliland had declared independence a year before (May 1991), deeming its 1960 union with Somalia–already contested due to questions around its enactment–“null” and void. Ever since, Somaliland has effectively insulated itself from the turmoil afflicting Somalia and continuously exercised democratic norms, charting a distinct path for its citizens, currently estimated at 5.7 million. Although its independence was backed by 97% of voters in a 2001 popular constitutional referendum and has considerable international support, Somaliland’s statehood has yet to receive formal international recognition.
Although Addis Ababa and Mogadishu signed an agreement in 1988 to end hostilities and stop supporting each other’s insurgencies, their relationship has always been clouded by deep-seated mutual distrust rooted in their war history. For instance, Ethiopia’s military has been extensively involved in various bilateral and multilateral initiatives aimed at combating terrorism and stabilising Somalia since 2005. The army was instrumental in removing the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a precursor of Al-Shabab, from Mogadishu. It also supported both the Transitional Federal Government (2004-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (as of 2012). Yet, some government officials in Mogadishu resent the Ethiopian military operations as an invasion rather than a stabilisation mission, exemplifying how an enduring mistrust affects their relations.
Although ties between the two countries improved significantly during the latter years of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed’s (aka Farmaajo) administration, tensions reemerged as soon as Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reassumed the presidency in May 2022. Unlike his predecessor, the new president took an overtly hostile position against Addis Ababa while boosting ties with Cairo. In response to Mogadishu’s confrontational stance, Addis Ababa resorted to further strengthening alliances with Somalia’s key regional actors, leveraging longstanding amicable ties that the Ethiopian military has built.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland was signed in January 2024 amid these prevailing tensions. Given that the MOU facilitates Ethiopia’s access to the sea through Somaliland and Somaliland’s first-ever formal international re-recognition, the announcement inevitably infuriated Mogadishu, which, citing its claims over Somaliland, deemed Addis Ababa’s action to be an infringement of Somalia’s sovereignty. Ethiopian officials, however, stress that the MOU is reflective of and enabled by political realities on the ground, possibly referring to the following two situations regarding the relationship between Somalia and Somaliland.
The first one is that Somaliland has been operating as a fully independent state, evidencing its capacity to enter into agreements with international actors, including states, as it has been doing for the last three decades. The other one is the impracticability or unenforceability of Mogadishu’s de jure claim over Somaliland. Mogadishu is unable to act on its claim, and any external intervention on its behalf would likely result in significant international opposition. Given these circumstances, Addis Ababa seems reluctant to endorse the regional intransigence, which stems from Mogadishu’s unwillingness to acknowledge that its postcolonial aspiration of uniting Somalis in a single state has long since proven unattainable.
For Addis Ababa, the MOU represents a substantial strategic initiative to rectify the state’s fundamental vulnerabilities and mitigate risks to its national interests within and beyond its borders. The agreement’s significance is evident given that Ethiopia’s loss of access to the sea three decades ago has left it in an extremely disadvantaged position in a region marked by conflict, terrorism, and power rivalry. The government is now acting more assertively to overcome Ethiopia’s existential shortcomings, especially its lack of access to the sea-a consequence it perceives as driven by subversive geopolitical schemes.
Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea is also driven by pressing economic and security imperatives. Its economy has been rising rapidly since 2004, with its import and export sectors on an upward trajectory. Being landlocked, however, Ethiopia is highly vulnerable to political, economic, and operational changes in the neighbouring countries on whose ports its international trade depends. Hefty and fluctuating prices, inadequate port facilities, and inefficient cargo handling services are adversely impacting the living conditions of its 132 million citizens, limiting its economic potential, and diminishing its trade competitiveness.
Ethiopia also faces significant domestic and regional security threats from terrorist entities and piracy along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. As powerful global actors compete for influence in the Horn of Africa, where the coastal states have limited capacity to combat maritime terrorism and piracy, Addis Ababa is becoming more assertive of what it calls its inherent right and legitimate objective of establishing a naval presence to tackle the complex security challenges.
International response to the dispute between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu has been diverse, shaped by diplomatic norms and traditional alignments. Most influential players, including the AU, the UK, the USA, and the EU, emphasized dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu while expressing their support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, due to Mogadishu’s insistence that it would only have direct talks with Addis Ababa once the MOU is revoked, efforts to broker a dialogue between the two governments, including initiatives separately pursued by Kenya and Turkey, have been unsuccessful. The Arab League, a notable exception, rejected the MOU, reflecting its traditional support of Cairo’s geopolitical objectives.
Assertions endorsing Somalia’s territorial integrity seem less clear-cut than conclusive within the realm of actual international relations. This complexity is apparent given that numerous influential global actors have maintained close ties with Somaliland without Mogadishu’s approval. Some have recognized Somaliland as a self-governing region and others have even contemplated officially recognizing its independence. For this reason, narratives on the relations between Somaliland and Somalia are characterized by duality. In the meantime, as Somaliland’s democratic achievements get considerable international backing, Somalia continues to be entrenched in political instability and poses a regional security concern.
Furthermore, the international community’s response is influenced by various geopolitical circumstances, including Ethiopia’s strategic interests and regional standing. Addis Ababa’s legitimate concerns over irredentism and security challenges an unstable Somalia poses are widely recognized. There is also a positive stance regarding Ethiopia’s prospective emergence as an indispensable naval power capable of mitigating maritime terrorism and piracy, enhancing commerce and regional security. Due to these complex issues related to Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland, Mogadishu’s aggressive diplomatic appeals for intervention against the MOU have had few outcomes, illustrating a nuanced international position on Somalia’s territorial claims.
Rising Tensions and Risks: Implications for Regional Peace and the Next AU Mission in Somalia
Incompatible geopolitical interests are transforming the Horn of Africa into a new arena of tensions, as a Cairo-Mogadishu alliance, motivated by historical intransigence, is seeking to counter Ethiopia’s economic and security initiatives, which are aimed at challenging what the Ethiopian government perceives as an inhibitory regional status quo. Egypt and Somalia are reinforcing military partnerships and trying to leverage the upcoming AU-led mission to counter what they argue is Ethiopia’s interference in Somalia’s internal affairs. In line with this, Mogadishu is pushing for Ethiopia’s exclusion from AUSSOM, despite Ethiopia’s valid security concerns and leading roles in Somalia’s anti-terrorism and stabilisation operations for two decades.
Parallel to this, Egypt, embroiled in longstanding geopolitical disputes with Ethiopia over Nile waters and influence in the Red Sea region, has suddenly expressed a strong interest in Somalia’s stability and is preparing to send 5,000 troops there under AUSSOM. Seeking to secure broader support for its disputes with Addis Ababa, the government in Cairo has also tried to portray the Mogadishu-Addis Ababa disagreements as disputes between Arab nations and Ethiopia, hence pledging to support Somalia based on its membership in the Arab League. Exacerbating tensions, Egypt is already transferring large quantities of weapons and personnel to Somalia under a bilateral deal, with rumoured plans to deploy a further 5,000 soldiers.
Addis Ababa’s uneasiness amid growing tensions in Somalia should be viewed in the context of the region’s volatility. East Africa has long been plagued by tensions resulting from political crises, state failures, and regional power competitions, creating a significant security vacuum that various actors are trying to exploit. Current conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, as well as the unpredictable circumstances in South Sudan and Eritrea, have the potential to exacerbate Ethiopia’s own political and security predicaments, primarily stemming from radical ethno-nationalist insurgents with backing from geopolitical rivals. Ethiopian officials are, therefore, concerned that a hostile or fragile administration in Mogadishu, which is unable to counter Al-Shabab, an irredentist entity seeking to create a “Greater Somalia” under strict Islamic rule, is a danger to Somalia, Ethiopia, and the broader region.
Meanwhile, there are signs that the Cairo-Mogadishu alliance may expand, as Cairo and Asmara — whose relationship with Addis Ababa has recently soured ending its improvement post-2018 — are considering a possible military and intelligence co-operation deal “as part of Cairo’s efforts to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa… primarily aimed at countering Ethiopia’s recent actions.” The deal may also include mediation between Asmara and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an Ethiopian politico-military opposition entity with a longstanding history of hostility with the Asmara government and currently embroiled in an internal rivalry and troubled relations with the Ethiopian federal government. This episode illustrates Cairo’s dual strategies used to subvert Ethiopia in order to maintain its regional supremacy. The first is backing political unrest in the country by aiding armed groups that fight Ethiopian state forces. The second involves isolating Ethiopia by establishing military alliances with neighbouring nations, including Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, South Sudan, Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, albeit with little result.
As a hostile geopolitical alliance is taking shape in the Horn of Africa, the Ethiopian military is on high alert, with several vital strategic locations, including airfields, deep in Somalia reportedly under its control. Given Egypt’s history of supporting militants in Ethiopia and Somalia, the deployment of Egyptian troops to the region, along with the transfer of heavy weapons, may boost the activities of armed groups fighting against the Ethiopian state. In light of Mogadishu’s recently publicized intentions to support insurgents in Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s security may take more proactive measures against military assets under the Somalian government. Addis Ababa’s recent warning to Mogadishu that it “cannot tolerate… actions that endanger the gains made against regional and international terrorist groups,” exemplifies this scenario.
Leaders and the broader public in Somalia’s regions, including Jubaland, Puntland, and Southwest, strongly oppose the prospects of replacing Ethiopian forces with Egyptian troops in the next AU-led mission to Somalia. Echoing these concerns, Mohamed Abdi, the Governor of Bakool, said, “Egypt has a troubling history of arming clan militias in Mogadishu with tanks and artillery, which led to attacks on our people and the destruction of towns like Hudur.” Some prominent actors are even threatening to fight Egyptian troops if deployed in their regions. For example, Colonel Ali Abshir of the Somali National Army, in command of security in the Gedo region, warned, “Anyone trying to… bring in Egyptian forces, we will fight the same way we fought against the terror group Al-Shabaab.”
Given the growing opposition, Egyptian personnel deployed to Somalia may face serious security risks from forces that disapprove of their presence in their territories. Moreover, considering the Somalian army’s lack of capacity to safeguard its assets effectively, in addition to being infiltrated by Al-Shabab, the heavy weapons being shipped from Egypt may eventually be acquired by terrorist entities and rival clan militias, exposing Somalia and the entire Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to increased security threats. These risks are evident in Al-Shabab’s recent seizure of “large quantities of weapons from Somalia’s government forces. With these circumstances, Somalia’s unregulated militarisation might potentially lead to the reinstatement of the recently lifted international arms embargo on Somalia, which would worsen the country’s already difficult security situation.
Besides its national and regional security implications, the Egyptian involvement in Somalia is worsening the existing political divisions between the central government and regional leaders. Local actors fear that Cairo is attempting to expand its disputes with Addis Ababa over Nile waters to Somalia at the expense of the limited window of opportunity they have left for state reconstruction. However, instead of reviewing its actions in light of the growing opposition, the administration in Mogadishu is trying to silence leaders who disagree with its policy by, for example, threatening to remove the immunity of MPs “accused of endorsing Ethiopian military activities in Somalia”. With political disputes already weakening Somalia’s unity, the central government’s unpopular policy may compel several regional states to seriously consider pursuing their independence, undermining the prospect of a functionally united Somalia.
Major stakeholders are now voicing alarms about Egypt’s military engagement in the region and the possibility that a poorly designed AUSSOM would aggravate regional tensions. For example, opposing the prospects of Egypt’s inclusion in AUSSOM, some of the existing troop-contributing countries (TCC) are urging the AU to carefully design the mission’s structure to avoid exacerbating the already fragile situation. Donors have also shown reluctance to allocate funding to the mission due to concerns over Egypt’s expanding influence in Somalia and its detrimental effects on Somalia’s stability and regional peace.
US authorities are among those voicing concerns about excluding Ethiopian troops from AUSSOM. For instance, the U.S. Africa Command chief, describing Ethiopia as an “anchor and frontline” country in ATMIS with critical “contributions to the [mission’s] liberation and stabilization” efforts, remarked that he is concerned by the potential breakdown of collaboration between Ethiopian and Somalian forces. In general, there is growing consensus among key stakeholders that AUSSOM’s prospects are bleak without Ethiopia’s involvement, evidenced by how recent reductions in Ethiopia’s counter-terrorism operations in Somalia are already creating a vacuum favourable to Al-Shabab’s recruitment of militants, undermining years of progress.
Meanwhile, authorities in Hargeisa, threatened by the Cairo-Mogadishu-led military buildup, are taking precautionary measures. While speeding up preparations for signing and implementing a binding agreement with Ethiopia, they are cutting ties with Egypt. For instance, the government has recently closed an Egyptian cultural centre in Hargeisa and ordered the staff to depart within 72 hours, citing espionage and national security risks. As opposition grows against Egypt’s increased involvement in the region, Cairo has warned its citizens against all travels to Somaliland.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the escalating tensions, primarily driven by the Cairo-led regional alliance aimed at countering Ethiopia’s strategic initiatives and growing regional influence, could have immense security consequences for the Horn of Africa. The possibility of a war between Ethiopia and Somalia, despite Mogadishu’s earlier remarks about going to war, is minimal, as Somalia lacks the capability to start and sustain a full-scale conflict with Ethiopian security forces. This scenario, however, does not rule out the possibilities of localized skirmishes between state forces or, even more seriously, a catastrophic proxy conflict, as numerous armed factions in Somalia—and, to some extent, Ethiopia—may find the deteriorating security conditions conducive to escalating assaults on targets associated with rival geopolitical players, specifically Egypt, Somalia, and Ethiopia.
With the widening political divide between regional and central government forces, Al-Shabab’s recent gains, and the enduring tensions among rival clan militias, the odds of the situation in Somalia transitioning to full-scale fighting are high. This could potentially destabilize the entire region, with implications for Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea. A broader regional instability could disrupt trade and investment, hamper maritime activities, cause displacement and loss of vital infrastructure, lead to complex political turmoil, and trigger significant humanitarian crises.
While breakdowns in talks resulting from inflexibility take their fair share, Egypt’s military involvement, which is inviting even more parties to the dispute, is the critical element exacerbating the situation and enabling a potential regional crisis. Amid these serious concerns, AUSSOM has become a crucial factor that could either help de-escalate tensions by reshaping the military dynamics in Somalia or worsen the situation by being leveraged to advance the geopolitical agendas of Cairo and Mogadishu. The mission’s operations in such turbulent settings pose substantial threats to the safety of personnel deployed to Somalia, especially Egyptian troops. Furthermore, the security challenges, coupled with the absence of consensus among principal stakeholders, may complicate the entire operation, potentially undermining the AU’s reputation and risking the success of its future missions.
Promoting Regional Stability: Policy Considerations
De-escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa serves all parties’ best interests. However, given the historical and geopolitical nature of the current disputes, the resolutions should focus on sustainably addressing the underlying issues. Here are some factors to consider towards this end:
Cairo’s reliance on old power structures no longer serves its interests effectively.
Its ability to maintain exclusive control over resources and strategic locations like the Nile and the Red Sea is declining as the geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa is changing with regional players, including Ethiopia, significantly expanding their economic, military, and diplomatic influence. With the completion of the GERD and the implementation of the CFA, Egypt’s historical hydro-hegemony, which was retained through treaties that excluded the rights of upstream countries, has already faded away. Ethiopia’s growing naval ambitions, related alliances, and increased competition from regional actors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are challenging Egypt’s long-held claim of exclusive dominance over the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Cairo must acknowledge the new reality that its influence and national interests in the Horn of Africa are best maintained through cooperation rather than by trying to reinvent its traditional geopolitical architecture of unilateral dominance.
Some practical steps that Cairo might need to consider include:
- Reevaluating its stance on the CFA and joining the rest of the NBI countries in ratifying it, as its refusal will not prevent the CFA’s implementation but may instead diminish Egypt’s influence over Nile governance
- Accepting that Ethiopia’s rise as a capable maritime player is both imminent and beneficial to Egypt’s economic and security interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, where piracy and maritime terrorism have hampered trade flows and significantly reduced Suez Canal revenues
- Re-engaging with Addis Ababa in discussions aimed at achieving an amicable resolution to its concerns on the GERD, as its present adversarial posture, particularly in driving Somalia’s militarization, would only undermine its negotiating leverage now and in the future
- Committing to building trust, crucial for meaningful talks and mutually agreeable settlements to all outstanding issues, by refraining from interference in Ethiopia’s internal political matters, especially supporting factions opposing the Ethiopian state
Cairo has real water security issues, but they are not the GERD’s fault, as neither the dam’s non-continuous filling nor its regular flow has impacted downstream nations. Cairo’s real water security threats come from its complacency and excessive water use, which have prevented the government from adopting more innovative and conservation-oriented water management practices despite Egypt facing droughts and a high population growth rate. The contrast between approaches pursued by Addis Ababa and Cairo in the face of threats from climate change might indicate where Cairo should focus more. As Ethiopia, the source of 85% of the Nile waters, has planted around 40 billion trees in the past six years under its Green Legacy Initiative, Egypt, which contributes nothing to the Nile’s flow, has invested itself in unsustainable water-intensive projects like the “Green River” that it is building in the desert. Therefore, while pursuing cooperation with upper riparian countries on the Nile, Cairo must also focus on improving its water management practices, including modernizing its irrigation agriculture, avoiding wasteful initiatives, and diversifying its access to water resources.
Mogadishu’s preoccupation with attempting to reintegrate with Somaliland is unrealistic and a diversion from pressing local issues.
The union between Somalia and Somaliland has been defunct for over thirty years, with around 80% of Somalilanders having no lived experience of being part of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Somalian government holds minimal if any, leverage over Somaliland, which has not only insulated itself from the turmoil affecting Somalia but has also forged a strong country rooted in its distinct national identity. In a practical sense, as evidenced already, Somaliland’s pending formal international re-recognition does not mean that the international community needs Mogadishu’s consent to engage in political, economic, or security dealings with Hargeisa.
Somalia’s stability is threatened by complex political, security, and economic challenges, which require the government’s undivided attention. The peripheries are drifting more away from the center, mainly owing to disputes over constitutional issues and policies pursued by Mogadishu in the absence of consensus among critical regional actors. The vulnerability of state security forces and the government’s infiltration by Al-Shabab have led to a rise in terrorist attacks and setbacks in the progress achieved against terrorism over many years. Moreover, corruption, ranking number one on the Transparency International Corruption Index in 2022, and poor governance are weakening state institutions and obstructing the economy from capitalizing on international support, including its newly attained debt service relief.
Over the past two decades, the security partnership that Ethiopia and Somalia maintained based on their mutual interests has been crucial in pushing radical groups out of Mogadishu and confining their activities to isolated areas. Addis Ababa’s involvement in Somalia’s stability is motivated by its commitment to bilateral ties with Somalia and the challenges that Somalia’s instability poses to its own national interests. Considering that a fragile Somalian government is a threat to Somalia, Ethiopia, and the broader region, Ethiopian security forces may continue to be engaged in Somalia’s security matters regardless of Mogadishu’s consent.
In light of the points above, Mogadishu may need to consider the following pragmatic measures:
- Adopting a pragmatic approach to the Somaliland issue and engaging in dialogue to secure a stable and prosperous future for both nations
- Refocusing the state’s limited resources, both political and diplomatic, on addressing pressing governance, economic, and security challenges rather than pursuing the unattainable objective of re-uniting with Somaliland
- De-escalating the growing confrontational stance toward Addis Ababa and choosing dialogue to resolve outstanding issues and safeguard long-term mutual interests in regional stability
- Reevaluating its military alliance with Egypt with the objective of preventing Somalia from becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts, which could threaten its national unity, security, and regional stability
- Pursuing a more cooperative approach with Ethiopia and the current TCCs regarding the architecture of AUSSOM, acknowledging that the mission’s success largely depends on the capabilities these actors have built through years of involvement in Somalia
Addis Ababa: Advancing strategic national goals necessitates investment in cultivating a conducive regional climate.
Ethiopia’s strategic initiatives to address its fundamental vulnerabilities and secure progress for its growing population have significant regional ramifications. Given that these strategic moves necessarily challenge and reconfigure the regional status quo, regional players may misinterpret or view them as threats. These conditions demand that Addis Ababa convey that its strategic projects—especially those with geopolitical consequences—are reasonable, necessary, and legitimate. Equally essential, since its prosperity and stability are inextricably tied to the broader region, Addis Ababa must guarantee that its actions protect the legitimate interests of neighboring countries and benefit them and the wider region.
In light of these necessities, the following practical measures might help create a regional climate that is more supportive of Ethiopia’s current and future strategic initiatives:
- Implementing effective public engagement strategies to ensure that the Ethiopian public is adequately informed, meaningfully involved, and actively supports the initiatives
- Enhancing regional integration and mitigating tensions through increased cooperation, joint ventures, and diverse connectivity among neighboring nations
- Leveraging the newly implemented CFA to acquire financial and technical backing for developing water resources in the Nile Basin
- Utilizing international venues, particularly regional and continental frameworks such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), and the forthcoming Nile Basin Commission (NBC), for effective dispute resolution when necessary
Mogadishu is free to choose its friends, but it should not host unrest at the expense of regional stability. The Cairo-sponsored militarization in Somalia entails a severe and direct threat to Ethiopia’s national interests, both at home and across the region. The main objective of the Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu coalition is to nurture a hostile regional environment and undermine Ethiopia’s legitimate aims of developing its natural resources and securing maritime access via regional collaboration. In light of these challenges, Addis Ababa should consider taking the following measures:
- Finalizing and implementing the MOU as quickly as feasible, as delaying the announcement of practical steps may incentivize different players to continue attempting to hinder the agreement and erode public trust
- Enhancing both military presence and partnerships with key regional actors in Somalia to establish buffer zones and avert potential threats posed by Al-Shabab and other hostile forces
- Ensuring national and regional security by coordinating conflict de-escalation efforts, including restricting Somalia’s militarization, with key stakeholders like TCCs, IGAD, the AU, the UN, and the USA
- Building strong maritime partnerships with naval powers to rapidly develop Ethiopia’s navy and combat regional piracy and maritime terrorism effectively
- Diversifying port options, including the continued use of Djiboutian facilities, as a strategy to promote regional integration, interdependence, and efficiency
- Promoting internal stability by improving administration and public services, broadening political dialogue, and effectively neutralizing insurgents, particularly in Amhara and Oromia
Other Key Stakeholders: The next AU-led mission in Somalia should be planned with the objective of preventing it from becoming an instrument of proxy war and addressing regional factors that might lead to such conflicts.
The AU, the UN, the US, and other principal stakeholders are responsible for ensuring that the next AU-led mission is not exploited for geopolitical objectives, much alone for hostile ones. It is no secret that “the primary aim of Egypt in the region, including its alliance with Asmara, is to curb Ethiopian influence in the Horn of Africa and put pressure on… [the] government,” rather than to promote peace in Somalia or the broader region. Cairo’s intervention in Somalia, including the possible deployment of its soldiers, is escalating tensions between the central government and regional players, who have warned that they would fight Egyptian forces if they enter their territories. In light of this, the planning process must carefully assess the implications of Egyptian forces’ inclusion in AUSSOM, especially in capacities beyond providing technical support to the mission. On the other hand, it is imperative to leverage the immense capabilities of Ethiopia and the rest of the TCCs, acquired over decades, to ensure the success of AUSSOM and the longer-term stability of Somalia.
The overall planning should also take into account the broader security risks associated with the ongoing Egyptian-led militarisation in Somalia, including the likelihood of the heavy weapons falling into the hands of radical actors, especially in light of the growing ties between Al-Shabab and Yemen’s Houthis. Key partners must leverage their institutional, diplomatic, and financial capabilities to regulate the ongoing transfer of heavy weapons and deployment of military personnel as a necessary step towards de-escalating tensions and averting broader regional instability.
Efforts to help defuse tensions in the Horn of Africa must also consider that prolonging the Somaliland issue delays conflict resolutions in Somalia and the broader region. The Somaliland stalemate is partly caused by the international community’s failure to facilitate a timely and adequate response to its quest for formal recognition. With the moral authority to lead in the matter, the AU should act upon its 2005 report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland and reengage African leaders to resolve the Somaliland case as soon as possible. Given this context, the next AU chairperson’s crucial tasks should include organising an AU-led pragmatic response to Somaliland’s quest for formal recognition as the continent’s strategic priority.
For reference in APSA:
Kabeta, Bisrat Lemessa. 2014. “Old Rivalries and New Frontiers: Geopolitical Tensions and Their Implications for Regional Peace and the AU Mission in Somalia.” Nexus Forum for Research and Dialogue. Geopolitics Commentary, October 22. https://nexuspolicyforum.org/.
Author
Bisrat Lemessa Kabeta (PhD), Executive Director of the Nexus Forum for Research and Dialogue (NeFRaD), where he leads initiatives that promote policy research, advocacy, education, and capacity building in Ethiopian politics, economy, and society. He is also the owner and director of Headway Partners, a consultancy firm that specialises in research, management, and training services across development, relief, and public sectors.